Wikinews interviews specialists on China, Iran, Russia support for al-Assad

September 23, 2013

Over the past week, diplomatic actions have averted &mdash; or, at least delayed &mdash; military strikes on Syria by the United States. Wikinews sought input from a range of international experts on the situation; and, the tensions caused by Russia's support for the al-Assad regime despite its apparent use of chemical weapons.

Tensions in the country increased dramatically, late August when it was reported between 100 and 1,300 people were killed in an alleged chemical attack. Many of those killed appeared to be children, with some of the pictures and video coming out of the country showing &mdash; according to witnesses &mdash; those who died from apparent suffocation; some foaming at the mouth, others having convulsions.

Amongst Syria's few remaining allies, Iran, China, and Russia continue to oppose calls for military intervention. In an effort to provide a better-understanding of the reasoning behind their ongoing support, the following people were posed a range of questions.

Interviewees

 * Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow at the in Washington, D.C.
 * Kerry Brown, Professor of Chinese Politics from the University of Sydney, Australia
 * Farideh Farhi, an Affiliate with the Graduate Faculty of Political Science, and lecturer, at the ̣̣University of Hawai'i,
 * Mehran Kamrava, Professor and Director of the at Georgetown University in Washington D.C.
 * , Professor of International Security Studies at Tufts University near Boston, Massachusetts
 * Rana Mitter, Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China at the University of Oxford, England
 * Walter Posch, an Iran expert at the (SWP) in Berlin, Germany; and,
 * Sam Roggeveen, a fellow of the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia

Wikinews Q&amp;A
,, and have remained as allies to the  government despite the alleged use of chemical weapons in  on August 21, 2013. Wikinews queried the listed subject-matter experts regarding the diplomatic relations between these nations, and the reasoning behind such.

China
There are suggestions China wants to maintain its financial ties with Syria as its third largest importer in 2010. Would you agree with this?


 * Brown: I don't think that is China's key priority. China has a massive economy, and Syria is a very minor player in this. It has some, but not much, energy from Syria. Its real concerns in the current conflict are for stability, and geopolitical.
 * Farhi: China's conduct in Syria has been similar to its conduct elsewhere. It has given support to Russia in international forum such as the UNSC [] and has acted opportunistically wherever its economic interest could be pursued. But, Syria is really not an area of interest for China. Its actions and support for the Russian position is derived from its general concerns regarding American imperialism and unilateralism.
 * Mitter: China will want, in general, to maintain financial ties with Syria as it does with many countries. China's general position is that internal politics of countries should not interfere with economic ties.

Do you think China is talking from experience when it says that foreign countries shouldn't get involved with Syria's internal affairs?
 * Roggeveen: That stance reflects China’s history as a weak, developing country with a host of territorial disputes with its neighbours. does not want to set international precedents that will allow third parties to interfere with, for example, the  issue,, the  or the.
 * But increasingly, China’s stance will conflict with its growing strength and growing responsibilities on the world stage. China is already the world’s second biggest economy and a major strategic power in the Asia Pacific [region]; and, it will increasingly be expected to take up responsibilities that come with such power. Also, as we saw in the case of &mdash; where China sent a fleet of ships and aircraft to evacuate its nationals &mdash; China has interests and citizens all over the world, both of which need to be protected.
 * Brown: It [China] has always stood by non interference of other counties in the internal affairs of sovereign states; though, this position has changed over time since it was formulated on the back of China's experience of colonisation in the early part of the twentieth-century. Its main priority now is to not see the escalation of issues, as was seen in and ; where it runs the risk of being sucked into lengthy conflicts with no real gameplan, and no clear outcome that is relevant to it. It does not see the Syria[n] conflict [as] one where there is a an easy, viable, alternative option waiting to govern the country. And, it is very sceptical about US and others' claims that they can control this problem.
 * Farhi: Yes, rejection of interference in the internal affairs of other countries &mdash; particularly of a military kind &mdash; is a principled Chinese position in areas where China doesn't have an over-riding interest.
 * Mitter: China has been a hardline advocate of strong territorial sovereignty for decades. This is, in part, a product of its own history of being invaded and occupied by other countries.

China abstained from a UN Security Council resolution on Libya &mdash; do you think they are trying to reprise what happened in Libya in terms of regime change?
 * Roggeveen: China and Russia suspect the 'responsibility to protect' doctrine, which was used by Western powers to justify the Libya intervention, was a smokescreen for regime change. So, they are wary of seeing something similar happen in Syria. China also prefers not to be on its own in the Security Council; so, if the Russians come down against a Libya-like resolution, [the] chances are that China will join them.
 * Brown: They felt there was clear mission-creep with Libya. What, however, has most emboldened them in opposing action in Syria is the position of Russia; which they have been able to stand behind. Diplomatically they dislike isolation, so this has proved the issue they have taken cover from.
 * Farhi: Libya has set a bad precedent for many countries who supported, or did not object to, NATO action. So, yes, the Libya example is a precedent; but, in any case, the Syrian dynamics are much more complex than Libya and both Russia and China &mdash; as well as Iran &mdash; genuinely see the attempt to resolve the imbroglio in Syria through military means as truly dangerous. In other words, they see the conduct of Western powers in the past two years as spawning policies that are tactically geared to weaken the Assad regime without a clear sense or strategy regarding what the end game should be. Particularly since at least part of the opposition to Assad has also elicited support from  radicals.
 * Mitter: In general China is reluctant to take decisive action in international society, and [at] the UN. It prefers its partners, such as Russia, to take on confrontational roles while it tries to remain more neutral and passive.

Do you think a political solution is the only realistic means to resolve the Syrian issue?
 * Roggeveen: At the moment, both sides [in Syria] evidently feel they can still obtain their objectives through force. Perhaps one of them will be proved right; or, perhaps there will be a long-term stalemate with Syria split between regime and opposition forces.
 * One important change is the chemical weapons agreement; which now makes it much more difficult for the US or Israel to intervene militarily. The deal also gives the regime some degree of status as a legal authority with which outside powers must negotiate. That weakens the hand of the opposition; but, it could open a door for an international diplomatic intervention to achieve &mdash; firstly &mdash; a cease fire. and perhaps then something more substantive.
 * Brown: There is no appetite for the kinds of expensive and very hard interventions [undertaken] in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, in any case, the US and its allies don't have the money to fund this, and their publics evidently feel no case has been made yet for getting involved. People are weary of the endless arguments in the, and feel that they should now be left to deal with their own issues. China, in particular, has tried to maintain as strong a [...] network of benign support in the region as possible, while avoiding getting sucked into problems. There is no viable opposition in Syria that would make it easier to justify intervention; and, no easy way of seeing how this tragic civil war is going to be easily ended.
 * Farhi: Syria has become the arena for a proxy war among regional and extra-regional players and yes its civil war will not end until all key players and their external supporters develop a political will to end the conflict. For the conflict to end, the bankers feeding the conflict should agree to stop funding it.
 * Mitter: Yes. But, it will depend on Russia, China, and the US, being able to come up with a compromise solution. That looks [to be] a long way off.

Iran
For many years, Syria has been considered Iran's "closest ally". What vested interest does the Iranian government have in keeping Bashar al-Assad in power?
 * Kamrava: These interests are primarily strategic, with both countries sharing common interests in relation to &mdash; particularly the  group &mdash; and [as] deterrence against [i intervention].
 * Martel: Iran's interests align very closely with that of Russia in supporting Syria and opposing the United States. Further, during this last week, offered to help Iran build a second . The policies of Russia, Iran, and Syria align quite closely; thus leading some &mdash; such as myself &mdash; to argue that we are seeing the rise of an "authoritarian axis" of states, whose policies are coordinated.
 * Posch: First, Syria was Iran's only ally against and [an] indispensable partner in Lebanon since the early 1980s.


 * Even before the fall of Saddam in 2003, Iran reinterpreted the basically pragmatic cooperation in the field of intelligence and security. Ever since Syria was part of a so called "axis of resistance" consisting of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and, the sole common strategic denominator of these different actors is hostility against Israel, which is always depicted as an aggressor against whom the Muslims should resist &mdash; hence, the [designation as an] "axis of resistance". Of course, forming an alliance 'officially against Israel' serves another purpose too: to take a stand against  without naming it. Much of the current crisis in Syria has to do with this scheme.
 * Farhi: Syria supported Iran during the ; and, that dynamic forged a long-standing relationship between the two countries that includes economic, political, and military cooperation. In more recent years, Iran, Syria and Hezbollah have self-identified as [an] axis of resistance against Israeli–American involvement in the region. Despite this, Iran initially mostly followed the Russian lead in the Syria. However as other regional players &mdash; such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as extra-regional players such as the United States &mdash; began to see, and articulate the weakening of, the Assad regime as a first step to the weakening of Iran, this enhanced Iran's threat perception, and gave it [an] incentive for further involvement in support of Assad.

Do you think Iranian support for the Syrian government is a way of standing up against UN sanctions imposed on them, and opposing ?
 * Kamrava: No. Iranian–Syrian relations are rooted in common strategic interests rather than in assumptions about US imperialism, or the role of the UN sanctions.
 * Martel: Both Iran and Syria share a strategic interest in undermining the influence of the US and the West.
 * Posch: Definitely not. The sanctions track is a different one, checking American "imperialism" &mdash; as you call it &mdash; is, of course. one aim.
 * Farhi: As has become evident in the past few weeks, the primary interactive dynamic regarding the Syrian imbroglio is being played out mostly in terms of US–Russian rivalry; and, Iran is following the Russian lead.

The UN has "overwhelmingly" confirmed use of chemical weapons in Syria. Do you think both sides have used chemical weapons?
 * Kamrava: It is undeniable that chemical weapons were used in Syria. But, I have not yet seen conclusive evidence for the responsibility of the use of chemical gas by one side or another. Until valid evidence is made available &mdash; proving who used chemical weapons &mdash; affixing blame to either the government forces, or to one of the fractious rebel groups, is only a matter of speculation.
 * Martel: I remain skeptical that anyone other than the Syrian government used chemical weapons. It is widely accepted that the Syrian government was behind the use of chemical weapons.
 * Posch: I think the Report is quite clear on that.
 * Farhi: I &mdash;as an academic, with no access to on the ground information &mdash; am in no position to know whether both sides have used chemical weapons.

Would you agree that part of Iran's vested interest in Syria remaining under al-Assad is bound to two factors: religion and strategy?
 * Kamrava: No, I do not agree. Iran's "vested interest in Syria remaining under al-Assad" is [a] product only of Iran's strategic calculations.
 * While foreign policies anywhere may be expressed &mdash; and justified &mdash; through slogans and ideological rhetoric, they are based on strategic considerations and calculations. Despite common, journalistic misconceptions, religion has not played a role in Iranian foreign policy; whether in relation to Syria or anywhere else.
 * Martel: Iran's vested interest in Syria is entirely geo-strategic. Iran's support [for] Syria is designed to undermine US power and influence. For Iran, no policy objective is more important than to possess . When the U.S. declared a "redline" if Syria "used or moved" chemical weapons, and then backed away from that redline, it is likely that Iran's leadership drew one principal conclusion:
 * the US redline on Iran's nuclear program is in doubt, the US commitment to preventing Iran from possessing nuclear weapons is in doubt,
 * and that Iran likely will test US resolve.
 * In strategic terms, doubts about the credibility of the US redline on Iran dwarfs any concerns about Syria's chemical weapons.
 * The belief in Iran &mdash; that the US may not be willing to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons &mdash; could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. It is difficult to exaggerate just how dangerous a nuclear-armed Iran is for regional and global security.
 * Posch: No, it is strategy, and perhaps ideology. Religion doesn't play too much [of] a role, even though the conflict has been thoroughly "sectarianised". This happened a few years back when the Saudis baptised (if that term is appropriate) the "axis of resistance" to "shiite crescent". The domination of the by members of one sect plays no role in Iran's security equation. Attempts to convert Syrian  to Mainstream Shiites are initiatives of some individual . I have already mentioned the strategic aspect, [an] axis of resistance against Israel and Saudi Arabia simultaneously; to this I would add Iranian concern over the  issue.
 * Farhi: The Assad government is a secular government, and Iran's relationship with it has nothing to do with religion or religious affinities. The relationship is a complex one &mdash; and, as mentioned before &mdash; forged as a strategic bond during the Iran–Iraq War, when Saddam's regime was deemed aggressively expansionist by both regimes.

Iran is home to the world's most populous nation. The Syrian rebels are. Could this be a Sunni vs. Shiite alignment in the ?
 * Kamrava: No. While sectarianism may be the lens through which some of the Syrian rebels see their fight against the government, ultimately the contest is over state power and capitalizing on opportunities created by the Arab uprisings in general; and, the Syrian civil war in particular. Sunni–Shia 'alignments' have nothing to do with it.
 * Posch: Usually, the Sunni–Shia divide is something Iranians and Saudis play up in order to put pressure on one another; usually, they were also able to deescalate. Syria, however, is the game-changer &mdash; for the simple reason that nobody believes the Saudis would control the post Networks in Syria. What Iran fears is an increase of the most-radical Sunni anti-shiism, the so called takfiris, spilling over onto Iranian territory.
 * Farhi: The Sunni governments in the region are working hard to use sectarian tensions as an instrument to fan popular resentments, in the region, towards Shi'ite Iran. But, the rivalry is actually political; and, has to do with the fears rivals have of what they consider &mdash; I think wrongly &mdash; to be Iran's hegemonic aspirations in the region.
 * Sectarianism is an instrument for shaping regional rivalries, and not the source of problems, in the region.

Russia
Russia is one of Syria's biggest arms suppliers. Do you think this means Russia's interest lies in economic benefit, as opposed to the humanitarian crisis?


 * Blank: Although Russia sells Syria weapons, Russia's main interest has nothing to do with humanitarianism or economics.
 * Rather, its main interests are to force the US to accept Russia as an equal &mdash; so that has an effective veto power over any further American actions of a strategic nature there and elsewhere &mdash; and second, to restore Russia's standing as an indispensable great power in the Middle East without whom nothing strategic can be resolved.
 * It should be noted that in neither case is Russia actively interested in finding solutions to existing problems. Rather, it seeks to create a bloc of pro-Russian, anti-American states and maintain simmering conflicts at their present level while weakening US power.


 * Martel: Russia's principal interests in Syria are twofold. First, Moscow's support is geopolitical in design. It is designed precisely to undermine and weaken American influence in the Middle East and globally. The extent to which Russia can undermine American influence directly helps to bolster Russia's influence. For now, Russia is such a vastly diminished power &mdash; both politically, economically, militarily, and technologically &mdash; that Russian policymakers are pursuing policies they believe will help to reverse Russia's strategic decline.
 * Second, Syria is Russia's strongest ally in the region, if not the world, while Syria is the home to Russia's only foreign naval base.
 * Farhi: Syria is Russia's only solid strategic ally in the Middle East. Syria, in effect, is a Russian client. Russia's interests lie in maintaining that foothold, and perhaps extending it.
 * It also has a concern regarding the civil war in Syria spawning what it considers to be extremist Islamist activities, which it has had to contend with within its own borders.

Do you believe Russia distrusts US intentions in the region &mdash; in the sense of countering the West on regime change?


 * Blank: It is clear that Russia not only does not trust US interests and judgment in the Middle East, it regards Washington as too-ready to use force to unseat regimes it does not like and believes these could lead to wars; more importantly, to the attempt to overthrow the present Russian government. That is critical to understanding Moscow's staunch support for Assad.
 * Martel: Russia's policymakers understand that American and Russia interests directly diverge. Russia seeks to undermine US geopolitical influence, and increase its own. It is using its support of the Syrian regime to accomplish that objective. American interests, by contrast, are largely to prevent the spread and use of chemical weapons.
 * Appallingly, Russia is supporting Syria despite the fact that all evidence points to Syria's use of chemical weapons.
 * One would think that American policymakers would be more critical of Russia; which is directly supporting a regime that used poison gas to slaughter its own men, women, and children.
 * Farhi: It is less about trust and more about protection of geopolitical interests and prevention of even more dire consequences if Assad goes. It is true that Russia feels that the United States and went beyond the mandate afforded to them by the UN Security Council in going after regime change in Libya.
 * However, Russia's geopolitical, and economic, interests in Syria are much more important; and, the relationship between the two countries [is] much deeper.

The Russian Government accepts that chemical weapons have been used in Syria. How does it come to claim that the rebels are behind the attacks even though it is widely accepted that the al-Assad government has stocks of weapons?


 * Blank: It [Russia] simply intends to defend Assad to the hilt; and is hardly unwilling to lie &mdash; especially as its intelligence service is notorious for fabricating mendacious and biased threat assessments, and is not under any form of effective democratic control.
 * Martel: Russia's claims that Syrian rebels were behind the chemical weapon attacks is, frankly, inexplicable. Worse, Russia's basic credibility is undermined by such statements.
 * Farhi: Russia claims Syria has presented it [with] evidence that the rebels have used chemical weapons; and Russia, in turn, has given the evidence to the UNSC. It has also called the UN report one-sided and biased. The bottom line is &mdash; the claim that the opposition to the Assad regime is at least as culpable in the violence being committed in Syria, opens the path for Russia to continue calling for a political solution [which] brings to the table all parties to the conflict in Syria, including Assad and his supporters; something the multi-voiced opposition has so far refused.

Would you agree that Russia's vested interest in Syria remaining under al-Assad is bound to two factors: economics and ideology?


 * Blank: As I said above, Russia's interest in Assad is bound to two geopolitical factors: maintaining the security of its regime; and, equally important, weakening America in the Middle-East &mdash; if not globally &mdash; and ensuring that Russia's great power status is thereby ensured.
 * Martel: Russia's vested interest in protecting Syria's al-Assad is driven by geopolitics.
 * To support Assad, is to counter US policy and influence; which is precisely what Putin's government seeks to accomplish. In many senses, Russia's support for Syria is entirely secondary to Russia's strategy of reversing its two-decade long decline in every measure of power. With its weak economy, dependence on petroleum for half of its national income, and increasingly authoritarian government, Russia has relatively little to offer the world &mdash; other than to oppose the United States as part of its strategy of reversing its decline.
 * While Russia's geopolitical influence clearly increased as a result of its support for Syria, its long-term economic prospects remain quite dim.
 * Farhi: It is economic as well as political.
 * Syria is a customer of Russian arms and goods; hosting a naval supply base in . But, as mentioned above, Russia has serious concerns regarding what comes after Assad. For Russia, the current regime is better than chaos or control by Islamists.