Wikinews interviews specialists on Russian intervention in Ukraine

March 5, 2014 In the past few days, tension has been increasing due to conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation which has led to the United States, the, and increasing pressure on Russia to remove their troops from.

Wikinews interviewed specialists in Russian foreign policy and specialists in international law about the legality of Russia's actions and the consequences of any sanctions imposed by nation economies.

Interviewees
Wikinews interviewed:
 * Jane Burbank, Professor of History and Russian and Slavic Studies at the ,
 * Jeremy Morris, Senior Lecturer in Russian Studies at the ,
 * Craig Brandist, Professor of Cultural Theory and Intellectual History in the Department of Russian and Slavonic Studies at the ,
 * Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow for Russia at the in
 * Yanni Kotsonis, Director, Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia in.

Wikinews Q&amp;A
Are Russian troop deployments into Ukrainian territory a clear violation of sovereignty?
 * Morris: Yes.


 * Burbank: Yes, the borders of the Ukrainian state were drawn up in 1991 and reinforced by the 1994 Budapest accords. See the article by Paul Goble on these accords.


 * Brandist: It would be hard to describe it otherwise. That said, however, it is quite extraordinary hypocrisy for the US and UK to strike moral poses about this, especially after and . Russia clearly has strategic interests in the region, and there is a large Russian-speaking population in much of Ukraine, a majority in Crimea and an important part of the east of the country, and the arrangement after the collapse of the  was clearly fragile, especially when  expansion took place. None of this is to excuse Russian actions, but they cannot be understood without focus on the 'great game' of which it is part.


 * Blank: By any standard Russia's actions represent a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and integrity, a premeditated break with numerous treaties signed by Russia guaranteeing Ukraine's security, integrity, and sovereignty, and thus is right these are acts of war.


 * Kotsonis: On the surface it seems so. Mind you, it is complicated because Russia has been given rights to the bases on the Crimea and this may give Russia the pretext for a larger intervention. But it does not seem to be a clear-cut legal case for intervention and everyone understands that this is Russia smarting over the loss of an ally in and guarding its own back yard interests.

Are we going to see a proxy war between the United States and Russia?


 * Morris: No.


 * Burbank: I doubt that we will have a real war, but note that the Russians who falsely accused the "West" and the U.S. for instigating the political activism of Ukrainians (denying that Ukrainians themselves wanted to change their corrupt government for a more democratic and inclusive one) now have managed, through provocation, to get the "West" involved in the conflict. (So far this involvement is only diplomatic and verbal.)  Moreover, the analysis so common in the Western media of a divided Ukraine (East vs West) has played into Russia's hands, setting up a scenario for strife and divisiveness.


 * Brandist: I think it unlikely at present. Russia humiliated the US when it entered to stop it becoming part of NATO, exposing the limits of US power in areas where Russia has an overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons. Russia clearly cannot contest the US on a global basis in the way that the USSR once could, but it remains a great power with a powerful regional presence, while the limits of US power have been graphically illustrated in the  and . This is another illustration of that.


 * Blank: It is too soon to know what we are going to see but a proxy war is one possibility as is a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia (note I did not say war).  In my personal opinion resolute NATO action  combined with  economic and political action of a similarly robust nature would force Russia to back down because it  knows it cannot afford to go up against NATO.  Indeed this operation was undertaken because  et al openly and [...] publicly declared their belief that Obama and other Western leaders are weak, irresolute, and afraid to act.  This calculation must be reversed decisively if peace is to hold.


 * Kotsonis: I doubt it. The US has used stern language but so far has taken direct intervention off the table. On the other hand Russia has declared publicly that it can intervene militarily and has decided that the US will not. "Proxy" does not capture it because Russia is actually in Ukraine and the US won't be.

In response to Russia's build-up of its forces in Crimea, Ukraine has ordered a full military mobilisation. To what extent can Ukrainian troops hold back and successfully fight Russian forces?


 * Morris: Anything is possible, but I think Ukraine lacks the political will to enter large-scale conflict. There may be insurgency-like fighting.


 * Brandist: Russia has overwhelming superiority in both the south and east of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian forces are not necessarily reliable in a conflict with Russia given the support for Russia among a substantial part of the Ukrainian population. Ukraine does, however, have substantial assets elsewhere and if Russia was to try to move into the Ukrainian heartland it would be a substantial operation. This is precisely why it is unlikely to do it. Moreover, Russia does not want a division of Ukraine, which could lead NATO to become established within the borders of the ex-USSR, so it is more likely it is seeking to change the facts on the ground so to be able to negotiate from a position of strength. It is difficult to predict how events will unfold on the ground, however, given the informal and extreme nationalist forces who are operating.


 * Blank: It is unlikely that Ukraine could prevail in such a conflict but I think it would unhinge Russian calculations, create the basis for protracted conflict, including guerrilla war for which Russia is not prepared, and thus force the West to act and begin the process of imposing costs on Russia that Putin did not foresee. Indeed that is one reason why this is an incredibly reckless action on Putin's part.


 * Kotsonis: No one thinks Ukraine can stand up to Russia. It's partly because Russia is bigger and better equipped, partly because Russia has bases in Ukraine, and partly because Russia is relatively united. One will have to see whether Ukraine will unite when so many of its citizens identify with Russia. We do not know the answer to this, only anecdote.

Would penalties imposed on Russia by the 'Western nations' being the United States, UK and France have severe consequences for the Russian economy?


 * Morris: Not really, so much depends on oil price for Russia, but fall in [the] due to lack of confidence may affect ordinary Russians' ability to buy imported goods.


 * Brandist: Clearly such measures would have negative effects, and the business community in Russia is clearly worried. That said, however, the likelihood of any coherent action against Russia is not great, not least because much of Europe is reliant of Russian gas. Moreover, it is European states that would face any potential flood of refugees and so European states will not be keen on too much pressure that could lead Russia to press Ukraine even more. effectively vetoed Georgia's attempt to be part of NATO, and it would have even more interests in trying to stabilize the situation now. In this situation the 'Western nations' mentioned have limited leverage, though it clearly would have an impact.


 * Blank: Ejecting Russia from the is meaningless. Sanctions that would register are sanctions on Putin et al so they cannot access their money, action in the WTO [] to arraign Russia for violating its  statutes, legislation  placing sanctions on Russia equivalent to those on  that have crippled it, staging a  on the rouble, and if necessary  blockading the  and  to prevent maritime commerce.  Most importantly but this is over time, Europe must reorient its gas and oil purchases away from Russia on a long-term basis.  All these moves must be taken together and in tandem with  military-political moves to uphold Ukraine's integrity and sovereignty  and  thus preserve peace by deterring Russia and imposing excessive costs upon it.


 * Kotsonis: It will probably make matters worse for Russia but it won't be a causal factor. Russia is overly dependent on commodities exports and is at the mercy of world prices. The world wants those resources and will probably not renounce them, but they may not be enough to keep the economy growing in Russia. Any penalties would only accelerate the secular trend.

There are reports that Russia could be ejected from the G8 group of developed economies. Would this be a major blow for Putin's domestic popularity?


 * Morris: Not really.


 * Brandist: In present circumstances not. There is a substantial constituency in Russia that is nostalgic about its imperial status, especially after the humiliation inflicted on the state during the period, and these conflicts are presented in this context. Certainly recognition of Russia at the G8 was a prestige factor, but there are clearly compensations on an ideological level in the present situation. This is an illustration of Russia's ascendency vis-a-vis the US and the  [European Union] in one sense. What it all means in the longer term depends on a significant amount of variables, however.


 * Blank: Ejecting Russia from the G8 is necessary but insignificant in its own right.


 * Kotsonis: No, it would probably increase his popularity in an us-v-them dynamic. Putin thrives politically on and it may be treated as an attack on Russian prestige. But less on Putin's reputation at home.

Is the Russian general public in full support of the deployment of their own troops into Ukraine, a separate sovereign nation?


 * Morris: No, this is a distraction by Putin from increasing economic and political problems in Russia. A minority of Russians support deployment and I think support from ordinary Russians will fall when they realise deployment may result in the killing of fellow.


 * Burbank: There is no such thing as a united Russian public. There are many views in Russia, as elsewhere.  Clearly, some people in Russia oppose this assault on Ukraine, as we have seen from the arrests and beating of demonstrators in . There is a section of the academic "community" &mdash; also a deceptive word &mdash; that is opposed to the invasion.


 * If you are interested in this, read the discussion on Ab Imperio's Facebook site, where many young academics are expressing their views.


 * I would like to repeat one point: the notion of a simple nationalized divide between East and West Ukraine is both false and counter-productive.  There are nationalists in many areas of the country, but there are also people with other political commitments.  It is dangerous for the Western media to reinforce the notion that nationalist sentiment  (pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian) is the only political force in Ukraine.  A whole generation has grown up since Ukraine's independence and many people, old and young and in the middle, have ideas about sovereignty and politics that are not simply "ethnic."


 * Brandist: Russia does not have a unified or stable 'public opinion' any more than anywhere else. Moreover, the Crimea and east of Ukraine are not necessarily viewed as fully a separate nation among many Russians. Many Russians have relatives there and go there for vacations. At present the majority are in support for the reasons I've just outlined. However, we have seen significant opposition movements in recent years, which shows that if things turn out badly then Putin may be vulnerable. There is clearly an assessment of risks that has been carried out by the, and so far it has paid off. Indeed, it probably strengthens Putin's compromised standing at home, but if things do go wrong then this could change quickly.


 * Blank: It is probably the case that Putin enjoys public support in Russia but that is irrelevant since the media's been so thoroughly cowed as to be unreflective of reality and the issue is not public opinion there but Putin and the ruling clique.


 * Kotsonis: Yes, this seems to be the case. You need to understand that Ukraine is in Russian minds somewhere between a close friend and a back yard. It was always assumed that this was the key alliance for Russia and tacitly understood that Russia's geopolitical interests would be respected. Europe's gamble last year was to pull Ukraine into the Euro orbit by forcing Ukraine to choose. Almost anyone in Russia saw this as a direct challenge. I can't say for certain but I imagine a large majority think the intervention is justified.